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"TOWARD A GENERALIZED
NOTION OF THE RIGHT TO
FORM OR JOIN AN
ASSOCIATION": AN
ESSAY FOR TOM EMERSON
Aviam Soifer*
INTRODUCTION

article, Toward a General
TOM EMERSON published his famous
1

Theory of the FirstAmendment twenty-five years ago. That article, and its subsequent elaboration in The System of Freedom of
Expression,2 solidified Tom Emerson's position as the leading legal
scholar of the first amendment in the post World War II period,
perhaps of all time. This well-known story surely merits celebration.
Tom EmerSon also published an important, albeit considerably
less famous article the year after his Toward a General Theory hit
the libraries. I want to use that article, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression3 as my text. I do so not only because Tom
Emerson's treatment of freedom of association is eminently worthy
of attention in its own right. Nor is it simply because groping for a
plausible constitutional theory for groups is very much in vogue today. 4 Rather, I hope to indicate where Tom's approach does not
*

Professor of Law, Boston University; B.A. (1969); M.U.S. (1972); J.D. (1972) Yale

University. For help in my most recent struggles to discuss the constitutional aspects of
groups, I would like to thank my associates generally and, in particular, Ron Cass, Mary Ann
Glendon, John Leubsdorf, Martha Minow, David Seipp, Steve Shiffrin, Carol Weisbrod, and
Larry Yackle, as well as Leiv Blad, Lisamichelle Davis, and Linda Love Mesler for their
careful reading and research assistance. I would also like to express my gratitude to John
Simon and Paul DiMaggio and the Yale University Program on Non-Profit Organizations for
very helpful comments and initial funding during my first effort to make sense of freedom of
association. Most of all, I would like to thank Victor Brudney for many years of disagreements about groups over most agreeable luncheons.
1. 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
2. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
3. 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Cornell, Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Community in the
Law, 54 TENN. L. REV. 327 (1987); Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1983); Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001
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only seem to me to reflect fully the functional variety and psychological and sociological importance of associations as amplifiers of
different viewpoints and as sources for our individual identities.
Two reasons make it particularly fitting to turn back to Tom's
pioneering work on freedom of association. First, Tom Emerson, of
all my teachers, is the one who most sincerely encourages and understands dissent. In questioning intellectual fashions as well as
government edicts, Tom displays civilized passion. He embodies
gentle, yet searching, lawyerly skepticism. My partial disagreement
with Tom's customarily lucid, powerful argument about freedom of
association is most appropriate in a law review issue honoring a
great man. Second, in a sense, Tom Emerson personifies the dilemma I want to address. His own remarkable, unpretentious contribution to the active life of numerous groups is interwoven with
his profound commitment to individualism and to privacy.
The appropriate constitutional relationship between associational rights and individual rights is the difficult, important issue
Tom addressed in his trail-blazing freedom of association essay. It
is impossible to find fault with his customarily meticulous analysis
of precedents; the clarity of his discussion of the underlying issues
remains unsurpassed. But I do want to take issue with his conclusion that "[q]uestions of associational rights must be framed and
decided in terms of other constitutional theories." 5 Indeed, I will
try in this essay to meet the direct challenge in Tom's assertion that
"it is impossible to construct a meaningful constitutional limitation
on government power based upon a generalized notion of the right
to form or join an association." 6
I.

AN INTRODUCTORY VIGNETTE

I first encountered a striking personal characteristic of Professor
Emerson's when I was an entering law student at Yale in 1969. I
found out quickly that Tom Emerson-and no one else-was the
person to seek out for advice when I was asked to sign a loyalty
oath on a government form for a loan I needed to help pay for law
school. This occurred against the backdrop of my 1-A draft status
(1983); Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and CulturalIdentity, 64 N.C.L. REV.
303 (1986); Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 68
(1987); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Minow, Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw.
U.L. REv. 106 (1987); Symposium, Law and Community, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1373-541 (1986).
5. Emerson, supra note 3, at 35.
6. Id. at 6.
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and my longstanding opposition to the Vietnam war. I had no class
with Professor Emerson that fall. Indeed, I had never met him.
When I suddenly appeared in his office, this very quiet man turned
from his work; it immediately became apparent that it was not going to be easy to chat with him, but that he was unusually willing to
talk. As I learned, along with numerous others, Tom Emerson is
very shy, yet he refuses to erect even the usual barriers. He is also
very decent, and so lacking in the aggressive verbal style present in
law school dialogue that his great tolerance for human foibles
makes commonplace gossip and small-talk virtually impossible. Instead, Tom Emerson listened. This famous law professor listened to
me with care. Somehow, Tom Emerson managed to dignify my
confusion.
He also provided a model of precise, lawyerly advice, blended
with compassionate concern that I should make up my own mind
about what I ought to do. Several years later, I had the good fortune to be Tom's teaching assistant in his small group constitutional
law course for first semester students. Tom Emerson did similar
things for many students, students who actually reflected Yale's
goal of geographic, political, and social diversity. He created a remarkable, costless marketplace for ideas, advice, and quiet support.
Moreover, when a group of us wanted to become involved with
some of the burning issues of the day, we turned to Tom Emerson
for practical help.
We relied on Tom for the Political Justice Workshop, for example, which Tom legitimated and advised. Although we never quite
figured out what criteria we should use to separate political trials
from other trials, his help was invaluable as we lept into the fray to
assist activist lawyers. Another context involved our remarkably
slow awakening to the legal dimensions of sex discrimination. Tom
Emerson was the teaching lawyer/law teacher for us. Alone and
without fanfare, he was sufficiently tolerant and generous to become
deeply involved as we found and fought for causes.
Then, and in the years that followed, Tom Emerson frequently
urged caution. He steered people away from putting too much faith
in the ninth amendment, for example, despite his triumph in Griswold v. Connecticut.7 He gently reminded law reformers that some
women would suffer greatly if Connecticut's divorce reform moved
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The magnitude of Tom Emerson's victory before the Supreme
Court in Griswold is evident in the record of the Senate Judiciary Hearings on the nomination
of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court. Hearingson the Confirmation of Judge Robert Bork to
the United States Supreme Court Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
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abruptly to a simple divorce-at-will scheme.8 Yet Tom Emerson always brings a keen freshness and a remarkable open-mindedness to
new ideas, new theories, changing realities. And Tom Emerson is
at his most impressive when he quietly but deliberately explains
something to people not initiated into the mysterious vernacular of
legal discourse. In speaking to or writing for groups of non-lawyers, Tom Emerson most vividly displays patience in combination
with his extraordinary, quiet passion for justice.
Because he will understand better than anyone else, I want to
sketch briefly why I disagree with Tom about first amendment protection for groups. I begin by reviewing what led Tom to write that
"as a starting point, an association should be entitled to do
whatever an individual can do; conversely, conduct prohibited to an
individual by a state can also be prohibited to an association." 9 I
then suggest that, while Tom's position is largely accurate as a description of what has been and still is generally said by the Supreme
Court, it overlooks the need for important exceptions. This need
cries out from the great muddle of recent decisions construing freedom of association.
In the final section, I indicate what these significant exceptions,
both in fact and in theory, do to Tom's thesis that, at most, groups
merit only the same constitutional protection individuals should receive. Sometimes, these exceptions point in the direction of affording certain groups less constitutional protection than the sum of
their individual parts. In other contexts, however, I suggest that
some groups should receive more constitutional protection than the
sum of the rights of their individual members. Thus, for example,
the racial or gender-based exclusionary practices of so-called private
clubs should not be permitted even if their individual members, as
individuals, would be protected if they decided to exclude on the
same basis. On the other hand, the rights of groups-but not of
individuals-to parade, to report the news, and sometimes even to
express themselves freely should be protected even in circumstances
when what the group seeks to do would not be permitted for
individuals.
I do not pretend to have met all of Tom's powerful doubts about
a generalized notion of the right to form or join an association. In(1987). Griswold and its theory of certain unenumerated rights apparently represent a constitutional approach now widely accepted by the American people.
8.

See generally L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); Review Sympo-

sium on Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 757-97.
9. Emerson, supra note 3, at 4.
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stead of "a generalized notion," I am suggesting more of a legal
realist's emphasis on a situation sense that provides a contexual
continuum about groups. Perhaps a large part of my disagreement
with Tom revolves around what one may properly expect of "a generalized notion," and whether such a notion is a necessary prerequisite to legal incorporation of important rights. But I maintain that
relegating communities and associations to no more, and sometimes
less, than the sum of the rights of their members misses a crucial,
structural element of first amendment theory. It also overlooks the
fundamental importance of group solidarity to those otherwise
nearly without hope and almost entirely without an adequate voice
to challenge prevailing presumptions. 0
In this Article, I will underscore the richness of the pioneering
questions about groups Tom Emerson raised decades ago and the
ways in which he addressed these profoundly difficult issues with
his characteristic open-mindedness, scrupulous scholarship, and unflagging commitment to the use of law to enhance freedom. It is
remarkable-and surely worthy of emulation-that Tom Emerson
has always done his lawyering, teaching, activism, and scholarly
work so unobtrusively. There is no apparent disjunction between
his roles. In fact, somehow Tom manages this unusual complementarity despite an environment in which competitive skepticism
prevails and rhetorical virtuosity often masks failures of empathy.
Tom Emerson is that rare role model who grows in esteem the more
you think and know about his world.
II. TOM

EMERSON'S FREEDOM OFASSOCIATION

AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Tom Emerson's 1964 article about freedom of association appeared in the context of considerable scholarly attention to the
"constitutionally protected right of association," as Justice Harlan
described the right in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson." Tom
Emerson celebrated the result in that decision, but he noted that
Harlan's majority opinion first used freedom of association as "derivative from the first amendment rights to freedom of speech and
assembly, and as ancillary to them," but then "elevated freedom of
10. See, eg., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL

(1987); T. MORRISON, BELOVED (1987).
11. 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). See, eg., G.

JUSTICE

AND ASSOCIATION

(1961); D.

ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY

FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

(1963); C. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962); and sources collected at Emerson, supra
note 3, at 2 n.4.
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association to an independent right, possessing an equal status with
the other rights specifically enumerated in the first amendment." 12
Tom perceived Harlan's move to be popular with commentators
yet, both in terms of theory and in resolving concrete issues, not
really warranted.
It is hardly surprising that Tom Emerson suggested a careful
system for thinking about freedom of association issues-he has a
great systematizing mind. In his article, he discusses four different
contexts for thinking about associational rights: (1) the general
power of the government to regulate the affairs of an organization
or its membership; (2) the use of governmental power to compel an
individual to belong to or otherwise participate in an organization;
(3) the rights of an individual member or a minority group vis-a-vis
an organization; and (4) the issues posed when government punishes associations, such as associating with criminals or with people
of different races.
Tom Emerson elaborated these four models by discussing the
Supreme Court's freedom of association decisions that followed the
NAACP v. Alabama decision. His development of the problematic
cases within his first category, for example, might serve as a model
for clear and concise scholarly discussion of judicial decisions. He
carefully tracked the Court's treatment of the right of association
through various inconsistencies and mixed metaphors.13 Tom indicated why he feared that, in recognizing an independent right of
association, the Court would resort to a weak balancing approach
when it sought to apply that right.
To Tom, the vague and often inconsistent treatment of freedom
of association in the cases in the late 1950s and early 1960s illustrated that the right itself was so broad and undifferentiated as to be
"essentially obscurantist."' 4 Moreover, he claimed that the balancing involved in construing freedom of association was "even less
12. Emerson, supra note 3, at 2.
13. In Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961), for example,
the Court placed freedom of association within "the bundle of First Amendment rights"
(Douglas, J., for the majority, striking down Louisiana statute requiring principal officer of
"benevolent" associations to file list of names and addresses of all officers and members). In
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 568-69 (1963), Justice
Douglas combined this bundle image with the idea that freedom of association may be located at "the periphery of the First Amendment" within a single sentence in his concurring
opinion.
14. Emerson, supra note 3, at 14. Emerson pointed out that, except for silent acquiescence in the Alabama NAACP decisions, Justice Black refused to adopt the doctrine of an
independent right of freedom of association. Justice Douglas took what Emerson kindly
dubbed "an intermediate position." Id. at 15.
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confined and less subject to objective application"1 5 than the balancing approach he deplored in cases dealing with rights of freedom of
speech, press, assembly, or petition.
Tom then traced independent freedom of association analysis
through the contexts of forced associations, minority rights issues,
and issues of personal associational freedom. Always, he found it of
little or no use. In its place, Tom suggested ways to reach similar
results through alternative doctrinal approaches. He argued that associational expression should be considered simply an extension of
individual expression. Therefore, he claimed, it should be provided
with the same protections. 6 It will not surprise anyone that Tom
Emerson, who redefined the debate about freedom of expression
with his development of a classification system distinguishing "expression" from "action," suggested a similar dichotomy for cases
involving associational claims.
It must be emphasized that Tom's system classified a great deal
of the conduct of associations as vital to expression. He argued, for
example, that public meetings, distribution of literature, solicitation
of membership, parades, demonstrations, the use of sound trucks,
and even "general organizational activities, including the conduct of
schools" were to be "as fully safeguarded as the actual utterance of
the words themselves."' 7 Tom also recognized that associations are
not always properly viewed as simply equal to the sum of their individual members. He observed that "[t]he conduct of an association
is likely to acquire unique qualities, to have effects which can originate only with an association rather than an individual."' 8 Both
this possibility of a qualitative difference between individuals and
groups, and the fact that certain conduct such as collusive pricefixing requires more than individual involvement, led Emerson to
claim that an association sometimes must be subject to governmental control on a basis different from individual conduct. To Emerson, "any general right of association must be subordinate to the
individual right."' 19
To oversimplify Tom's argument by way of a quick summary,
he generally regards associations as entitled to receive the same degree of constitutional protection as an individual should receive for
15. Id. at 14.
16. To the extent that the cases treated associational and individual rights differently,
Emerson argued, those differences merely involved issues of standing. Id. at 23.
17. Id. at 25.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 5.
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expression and for conduct surrounding expression. In those respects in which associations are unique, however, he would allow
them to be subject to additional governmental regulation. Tom obviously did not have to deal with the morass of doctrine beginning
in the mid-1970's that protects the commercial speech of corporations, for example, but his theory would seem to ally him with
Victor Brudney's assertion that "[g]roup action ... is legitimately
and traditionally subject to greater regulation by government than
20
is individual action."

Tom Emerson is well aware that freedom of association has
been a vital feature of American society for a long time. He also
points out the growing importance of associations. So what should
we make of Tom's reluctance to grant associations any constitutional protection beyond what their individual members enjoy?
Does Emerson's expression/action classificatory approach-despite
its significance for individual activity-adequately handle constitutional ramifications in the wildly diverse litigation involving freedom of association claims we now face?
III.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND RALPH WALDO EMERSON

This is not the place for even a quick review of the growing body
of historical work about the role of associations in American history. Notions of autonomous individuals banding together to proclaim-perhaps even on occasion to practice-civic virtue seemed
to dominate bicentennial celebrations of a version of republicanism
embraced as integral to the construction and ratification of the
United States Constitution. In recent years, numerous legal and social historians have suggested a comparatively caring, organic
golden age of community immediately preceding whatever period
their studies considered in depth. Once more we yearn to capture a
time before the ravages of what Frederic William Maitland called
"the pulverizing and macadamizing tendency of modern history."21
The quest for community seems remarkably fashionable today
across many academic fields. But in studying community, we seem
to display a particular propensity for the fallacy of "the conserva20. Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 259 (1981). Tom would not agree with Brudney's extension of this
argument to any group action "whether in the form of speech or otherwise." Id.
21.

Quoted in R. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 109 (1962).

Originally published

as THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1953), Nisbet's book is a stimulating discussion of rapidly
shifting alliances in the debate about the role of associations over several centuries.

1988]

THE RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN AN ASSOCIATION

tion of historical energy." 2 2 We organize our thoughts around a
notion that there is a clear-cut division between communitarianism
and individualism; we theorize as if "any flow of social energy in the
direction of one such pole can only take place by way of subtraction
from the flow of energy to the opposite pole."2 3 The search for
transformations within an easy dichotomy of ideal types such as
gemeinschaft versus gesellschaft,24 for example, or of caring communities that give way over time to possessive individualism, has
particular appeal because of our propensity to think in binary terms
in American law.
Every few decades we confront judicial reassertions of what
Karl Llewellyn called "the vicious heritage of regularly viewing
parties... as single individuals." 2 5 Recent examples abound.2 6 Yet
22. T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 29 (1978) (quoting J.
HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 42 (1961) in the context of early sociology and historical studies of American communities).
23. J. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 40 (1961).
24. T. BENDER, supra note 22, at 17. In 1887, Ferdinand T6nnies proffered the terms
Gem~inschaft and Gesellschaft to depict changes in social relations brought about by capitalism and urbanization. "Tilnnies's definition of Gemeinschaft corresponds to the historical
and popular notion of community; he offered family, kinship groups, friendship networks and
neighborhoods as examples of Gemeinschaft patterns of group solidarity ... Gesellschaft,
which he identified with the city, is ... characterized by competition and impersonality."
25. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 734
(1931). Carol Weisbrod first brought this statement to my attention in her comment at the
1986 Law & Society annual meeting on Zipporah Wiseman's paper, subsequently published
as Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, "100 HARV. L.
REv. 465 (1987). For nearly forgotten, earlier explorations of related themes by other eminent legal scholars, see, eg., Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43
HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930) (arguing that "the central idea of our law is relation" and analyzing four policies concerning judicial interference with different types of associations, denominated "the Strangle-hold Policy, the Dismal Swamp Policy, the Hot Potato Policy, and the
Living Tree Policy"); Sturges, UnincorporatedAssociationsas Partiesto Actions, 33 YALE L.J.
383 (1924) (arguing that unincorporated entities ought to be considered parties to legal
actions).
26. See, eg., McKleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1766-67, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct.
3199 (1987) (defendant challenging imposition of capital punishment failed to prove that "the
decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."(emphasis in original)); Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982) (litigant must show, among other factors constituting "an irreducible minimum" for art. III purposes, "'that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant'" (quoting Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979))); Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076,
2083-84 (1987) (federal Indian Land Act of 1983 invalid as an unconstitutional taking of
individual's "right to pass on property," despite concession that "[c]onsolidation of Indian
lands in the Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe" and recognition of "little doubt that
extreme fractionation of Indian lands is a serious public problem."). Probably the bestknown recent example is Justice Powell's deciding opinion in Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (emphasizing that equal protection rights are
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a number of first-rate studies of markedly diverse legal realms remind us that legal thought about groups has a long, complex, and
27
provocative past.
Most discussion of the role of groups in America seems to begin
with Tocqueville's observation that, "Better use has been made of
association and this powerful instrument of action has been applied
to more varied aims in America than anywhere else in the world." 28
Though Tocqueville paid particular attention to political associations, he also noted:
[A]ssociations are formed to combat exclusively moral troubles:
intemperance is fought in common. Public security, trade and
industry, and morals and religion all provide the aims for associations in the United States. There is no end which the human
will despairs of attaining by the free action of the collective
power of individuals.29
Tocqueville did not suggest that the "natural right" of association,
which he deemed to be "by nature almost as inalienable as individual liberty,"3 ° could or should be confined to political associations.
Instead, Tocqueville linked freedom of association to freedom of the
press. Vince Blasi examined what he calls this "checking value" in
terms of freedom of the press but, as Tocqueville noted, there is a
vital functional connection between newspapers and associations in
America. 3 They share a vital role in checking the abuse of power
by public officials. This is a linkage to which I will return in Part
VI as I develop the way in which my quest for a theory of groups
differs from the theory advanced by Tom Emerson.
Associations educate Americans to look beyond self-interest,
rights of the individual in the course of invalidating university's special admissions program).
See generally J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).
27. See, e.g., S. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing groups in litigation from medieval assumption of natural,
inevitable role for groups through ambivalence about representation by attribution, to current
confusion regarding consent and interest of individual members of the class); Horwitz, Santa
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY:
POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (W. Samuels & A.S. Miller eds. 1987) (tracing development of
various theories of the corporation prior to triumph of entity theory around 1900). For a
wonderful illustration that there may be no such thing as an original idea, see Frederic
Maitland's introduction to his own translation of 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE
MIDDLE AGES (1900).
28. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189 (J. P. Mayer ed. 1969).
29. Id. at 189-90.
30. Id. at 193.
31. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521. See generally A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 517-20 ("On the Connection
Between Associations and Newspapers," in which Tocqueville examines why "[tlhere is... a
necessary connection between associations and newspapers." Id. at 518).
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Tocqueville observed, and they serve as an incomparable check
against tyranny." Indeed, associations help teach us how to define
ourselves as individuals.3 3 In particular, Tocqueville emphasized,
"[n]othing more deserves attention than the intellectual and moral
associations in America."3 4 Yet, he warned prophetically, "American political and industrial associations easily catch our eyes, but
the others tend not to be noticed."3
In the course of my disagreement with Tom Emerson, I will
return to Tocqueville's emphasis on the importance of differentiating groups by their forms and varying functions. First, however, I
want to emphasize a paradox. Joining groups has been and remains
as American as celebrating our rugged individualism. Yet our most

basic myths tend to follow Ralph Waldo Emerson, Tom's ancestor,
whose transcendental faith in the individual left nothing between
that individual and the cosmos. Within a decade of the publication
of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Ralph Waldo Emerson

wrote in his diary, "Concert, men think, is more powerful than isolated effort & think to prove it arithmetically with slate & pencil:

but concert is neither better36nor worse[,] neither more nor less potent than individual force."
As R. Jackson Wilson put it, "What was most nearly new about
the Emersonian assertion and its dozens of echoes in American
literature and philosophy was the unqualified claim that society was
an obstacle to the alignment of the individual with cosmic order."37
Even within legal thought, it is easy to perceive a cyclical pattern in
32. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 516.
33. Toequeville treated the crucial educational role of associations in greatest detail in
his chapter, "On the Use which the Americans Make of Associations in Civil Life." He said
of civil associations, which he defined as those associations that do not have a political object,
"Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming
associations .... If the inhabitants of democratic countries had neither the right nor the taste
for uniting for political objects, their independence would run great risks, but they could keep
both their wealth and their knowledge for a long time. But if they did not learn some habits
of acting together in the affairs of daily life, civilization itself would be in peril." A. TocQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 513-14. Tocqueville continued, "Feelings and ideas are renewed,
the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one
upon another." IM.at 515.
34. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 517.
35. Id.
36. R. EMERSON, 7 THE JOURNALS AND MISCELLANEOUS NOTEBOOKS OF RALPH

WALDO EMERSON 437-38 (A.W. Plumstead & H. Hayford eds. 1969).
37. RJ. WILSON, IN QUEST OF COMMUNITY: SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED

STATES, 1860-1920, at 5 (1970). Wilson's superb study traces how, to Charles Sanders
Peirce, G. Stanley Hall, and other intellectuals of the post-Civil War period, "the idea of
community seemed the best response to the disintegrating effects of evolution and industrial
capitalism that threatened both their minds and their society." Id. at 31.
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our enthusiasms for romanticizing either radical individualism or
cozy communitarianism. Critical Legal Studies pundits, for example, might be surprised to find themselves sharing with Herbert
Hoover the idea that "[v]oluntary associations constitute self-government by the people outside of government., 38 It is also somewhat odd to find members of the Bohemian Club and the Century
Club now evoking Proudhon's advice to "[m]ultiply your associations and be free." 39 Surely there is safety and strength in numbers.
There is aid and comfort in identifying oneself by distinguishing the
groups to which one belongs from groups of other people. On the
other hand, guilt by association can never be entirely removed from
freedom of association. We are known by the company we keep; we
do define our friends by identifying common enemies. 4 As Shakespeare put it long ago, "[m]isery acquaints a man with strange
bedfellows." 4 1
Paradoxically, individuality is defined largely in terms of the
multitude of groups with which we simultaneously identify. Our
varying concepts of family and religious groups, for example, full of
complex psychological and other dimensions, are crucial to who we
think we are. Even putting aside these constitutive concepts, our
associations, groups, communities, and causes overlap and have
great power. They are not neatly confined by time or place.
38. A. SCHLESINGER, PATHS TO THE PRESENT 24 (1949); first published as Biography
of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1944).
39. Proudhon, a radical nineteenth century French social theorist, is quoted in Nisbet,
supra note 20, at xiii. The Bohemian Club has filed an amicus brief along with the Century
Club and numerous other private associations to urge the Court to strike down an effort by
New York City to force most large clubs in the city either to admit women as full, voting
members or to lose their liquor licenses and other benefits. See Amicus Brief, New York Club
v. City of New York, S. Ct. Doc. No. 86-1836 (arguments heard February 23, 1988).
It is both sobering and somewhat encouraging to discover that enthusiasm for community
is a particularly hardy perennial in American intellectual, utopian, and legal history. See,
e.g., R. KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1972) (examining the ideas and values underlying utopian communities and communal living); W. CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN
AMERICA (1973); C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980); R.J. WILSON, supra
note 37 (a study of some of the intellectuals of 1860-1920 who shared an interest in the idea of

community).
40. See K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966) (discussing and applying Emile
Durkheim's theory that deviant behavior draws people together in a common feeling of outrage against "them" in context of analysis of New England Puritans and penology). See also
R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (contemporary examination

of nostalgia for and diminishing commitment to community identification); Selznick, The
Idea of CommunitarianMorality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 445 (1987) (advocating "morality of the
implicated self" and "anchored rationality" within "community of reason").
41. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, Act 2, scene ii.
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Through ideas about our communities, we construct and reconstruct where we belong and who we are, as well as who we are
not.42 It is extremely difficult to sort out how the law should deal
with freedom of association claims. But the fact that we know it will
be hard to control a concept should not preclude recognizing, even
embracing it. We also cannot control the growth of wild flowers and
weeds, let alone distinguish each genre from all others, but we still
welcome spring.
IV.

MISERY AND POLITICS: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
POLITICAL SPEECH

Just as we have transformed Shakespeare's reference to "misery" and "strange bedfellows" into a cliche about politics, recent
Supreme Court decisions tend to limit freedom to associate either to
intimate associations or to "the freedom of individuals to associate
for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities." 43 In so describing freedom of association, the Court at first
glance seems to be following Tom Emerson's approach. That is, the
Justices derive freedom of association from freedom of expression.
They then render the two freedoms nearly or completely otiose.
A close look at the cases suggests, however, that the Court at
times uses freedom of association to do precisely what Tom Emerson feared. Freedom of association is commingled with freedom of
speech in a way that makes it easy to balance away both. Partially,
this whipsaw effect occurs because, in the years since Emerson
wrote about freedom of association, the Court has begun to protect
what was long thought to be unprotected, commerical speech. Even
"a private party" such as Consolidated Edison was protected from
regulation when it wished to put enclosures in its utility bills.'
42. For a good commentary on recent social anthropology supporting this point, see A.
COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY (1985).

43. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1945
(1987). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (protection of
the freedom to associate in both cases is viewed as a protection of individual liberty).
44. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U. S. 530, 532, 540 (1980).
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion described ConEd as "one group of persons" and Justice
Powell's majority opinion explained that regulation of the enclosures "strikes at the heart of
the freedom to speak." Id. at 546, 535. This weird variation on the marketplace-of-ideas
theme further stirred the porridge the Court began with the protection of commercial speech
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (voiding a statute which prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs). For a demonstration of the Court's lack of harmony in its four-part tests
and the like in this realm, an example that rises almost to the level of parody, see Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 2979 (1986) (greater
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Since newspapers that seek profits are protected, the Court reasoned
that other profit-seeking corporations also should be. 45 In the context of businesses claiming freedom of association and freedom of
expression protection, moreover, the Justices have begun to stretch
judicial notice past any realistic breaking-point. For example, they
proclaim themselves unconvinced, absent substantial proof, that requiring the Jaycees to admit women and to give them full voting
rights actually "will change the content or impact of the organization's speech." '46 Surely the Jaycees will be a different organization.
Surely such differences will be felt throughout an intricate web of
relationships and distinct voices in immeasurable, but nonetheless
significant ways.
Tocqueville observed, "A false but clear and precise idea always
has more power in the world than one which is true but complex."'4 7
Our difficulty centers around artificial attempts to create a neat, dichotomous view of associations. Despite its appealing result, Jaycees
provides a good illustration of how binary thought may create a
doctrine that could become an attractive nuisance. It also suggests
why sometimes groups should be entitled to less protection than
individuals, despite a group's freedom of association claim.
A.

Less Than Meets the Eye: Roberts v. United States Jaycees
In reviewing the Jaycees' discriminatory membership policy,

power to ban gambling completely includes lesser power to ban its advertising in newspapers
targeted to local population).
For devastating critiques of the recent expansion of commercial speech protections, see,
e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 52 IOWA L. REv. 1
(1976) (focusing on commercial motive behind speech); Brudney, supra note 20; Farber,
CommercialSpeech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1979) (suggesting
level of scrutiny of regulations depends on whether the commercial speech is serving informational versus contractual function); Patton & Bartlett, Corporate 'Persons' and Freedom of
Speech: The PoliticalImpact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 494 (emphasizing the
political consequences of corporate speech).
45. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781-83 (1978).
46. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984). Justice Brennan's majority opinion suggests that it would be indulging in sexual stereotypes to think any differently. The Court's facile distinction is reminiscent of one of the ways it ducked the freedom
of association claim in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). In glibly dismissing the
freedom of association argument made by a segregated academy, Justice Stewart failed to
distinguish the Court's defense of discrimination by a private club in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in which a private club denied service to a black guest of a member. Moreover, Runyon appears to turn on the nature of the school's commercial solicitation,
but its distinction between whom the school would admit and what they would teach is less
than convincing.
47. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 164. Tocqueville added, "Generally speaking, it
is only simple conceptions which take hold of people's minds." Id.
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Justice Brennan referred to two types of freedom of association. He
discerned: (1) a substantive due process type, entailing "certain intimate human relationships." 4 8 The Jaycees could not properly
claim this constitutional protection, however, because their group
was "neither small nor selective." 4 9 Brennan also spoke of:
(2) a first amendment associational element, which protected the
Jaycees' expressive activities, although not sufficiently to override
Minnesota's effort to attack sexual stereotyping in public
accommodations.5
Brennan considered the first, intimate type of association to be
integral and an end in itself. Curiously, he regarded the second,
expressive type of association as instrumental, therefore subject to
greater government intrusion. Though Brennan recognized that the
two categories of association are not logically exclusive,51 he
adopted a strongly dichotomous view. Since the majority perceived
the Jaycees' association claims to be only of the second, instrumental variety (only equal to the sum of their parts), Brennan quickly
found Minnesota's interest sufficiently compelling to override the
freedom not to associate, considered to be inherent in the freedom
of association. 2
The most persuasive opinion in the Jaycees case, perhaps the
most cogent of all the recent freedom of association opinions, was
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.5 3 Because she viewed the
Jaycees as primarily commercial and therefore subject to extensive
government regulation,54 O'Connor voted to uphold the regulation.
Yet O'Connor argued that the same regulation would be invalid if
the association were the type of expressive group which enjoys
"First Amendment protection of both the content of its message,
48. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. Brennan's reference here is to the line of modem decisions beginning with a successful challenge to Connecticut's proscription of birth control in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which have relied upon a variety of theories of
personal privacy-thought to include elements of individual autonomy and secrecy-but
have been extended to other family relationships as well. See generally M. GLENDON, STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN

EUROPE (2d ed. forthcoming); Karst, The Freedom of IntimateAssociation, 89 YALE L.J. 624
(1980).
49. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
50. Id. at 622.
51. Id. at 618.
52. Id. at 618-22.
53. Id. at 631. O'Connor concurred in part of Brennan's opinion and in the judgment.
Rehnquist concurred only in the judgment, without opinion. There were no dissents, but
Burger and Blackmun took no part in the decision.
54. Id. at 640.
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and the choice of its members."" Such an association would approach what she termed "the ideal of complete protection for purely
expressive association." 56

O'Connor therefore urged adoption of a different approach from
that favored by Brennan. Commercial associations, in her view,
merit little constitutional protection; expressive associations should
receive a great deal. 57 Moreover, O'Connor emphasized the constitutional dimension of governmental intrusion regarding group
membership beyond the realm of intimate personal relationships.
In this regard, without saying so explicitly, O'Connor moved close
to the freedom of association doctrine in the decades prior to the
Warren Court.58 She also appeared more consistent with the
NAACP decisions involving freedom of association from Harlan's
1958 Alabama opinion through the Court's strange 1982 opinion in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.," which protected a local
NAACP chapter from a huge state court fine imposed for organizing and enforcing a lengthy economic boycott of white merchants in
Port Gibson, Mississippi. To be sure, O'Connor's rhetoric was
hardly as dramatic as was the Court's language in ClaiborneHardware. Having begun by describing the concept of group action as
"chameleon-like," 6 Justice Stevens' majority opinion concluded
with the following memorable statement: "A court must be wary of
a claim that the true color of a forest is better revealed by reptiles
hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless free-standing
trees."6 1
55. Id. at 633.
56. Id. at 635.
57. Id. at 634.
58. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875). For a discussion of these decisions, and of the jurisprudential debate over "communal
ghosts" throughout the twentieth century, see my article based on the Sobeloff Lecture delivered at the University of Maryland School of Law, March 21, 1988, forthcoming in 47 MD.
L. REv. (1988).
59. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 898
(1982). The decision was unanimous, but Justice Rehnquist concurred only in the judgment
without opinion. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court went so far as to state that "The claim
that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact ... does not remove them
from the reach of the First Amendment." Id. at 911. The opinion is surely to be understood,
at least in part, as a response to the Court's perception that "the white establishment of
Claiborne County" had denied blacks "the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country fought a Civil War to secure." Id. at 918. For analysis of similar emphasis by the Supreme
Court on the underlying facts in the NAACP decisions in the late 1950s and early 1960s, see
H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
60. 458 U.S. at 888.
61. Id.at 934.
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Toward a Functional Typology: Federal Election Commission
v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life

A recent Supreme Court decision illustrates the wisdom of an
approach that considers both the type of association involved and
the type of expression, if any, implicated in the particular litigation.
In December 1987, the Court decided FederalElection Commission
v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life.62 Because this decision is not
widely known, and because it illuminates several important themes
about the freedom of association, I will describe Massachusetts Citizens for Life in some detail.
Read narrowly, Massachusetts Citizens for Life invalidated a
federal restriction on campaign contributions by a non-profit corporation only because the federal law infringed upon core political
speech.6 3 Read more broadly, however, Massachusetts Citizensfor
Life determined that the non-profit status of the association was
what made a constitutional difference to a majority of the Justices.
This broader reading is more than plausible; in my view, it is the
only interpretation that makes sense. Since the vote was so close
and the variables so numerous, however, it is not yet time to begin
popping champagne corks if you favor robust constitutional protection for non-profits. A closer look at Massachusetts Citizensfor Life
will underscore its promise and its puzzles.
The case began when a complaint reached the Federal Election
Commission alleging that a 1978 "Special Election Edition" of the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life Newsletter constituted an expenditure of corporate funds on behalf of certain political candidates.6 4
An expenditure for distribution to the general public would violate
section 441(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 5 The lower
courts disagreed about whether the Federal Election Campaign Act
62. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986). In this decision, the Court was sharply divided. Justice Brennan wrote for only three other Justices in one crucial section of his majority opinion and
Justice O'Connor concurred separately and discussed her concerns over the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent for four
members of the Court argued that non-profit corporations should not be treated differently
from business corporations. Justice White joined the dissent, but noted separately that he
continues to disagree with the string of recent decisions extending first amendment protections to corporations.
63. This interpretation is reinforced by the Court's decision less than a week before in
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986), holding it unconstitutional for Connecticut to condition voting in the Republican Party primary on a registration
requirement not desired by the Republicans. Justice Marshall's majority opinion rested on
freedom of association for political purposes.
64. Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 107 S. Ct. at 617.
65. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1982).
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actually covered the newsletter. They agreed, however, that if it
did, the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on political expression. 6 The Supreme Court agreed that the statute did cover
Massachusetts Citizens for Life's newsletter, but the Justices vehemently disagreed among themselves as to whether the statute
thereby infringed first amendment rights.6 7 This is hardly surprising. Currently, there is deep confusion surrounding attempts to reconcile vital, competing public interests in regulation of the political
process, freedom of expression, and freedom of association.
What does seem clear in the Massachusetts Citizensfor Life decision, however, was that a majority of the Justices agreed that it
makes a constitutional difference what kind of group is doing the
speaking. The status of Massachusetts Citizens for Life as a nonprofit was the key factor. In a crucial section of the majority opinion, moreover, Justice Brennan wrote for a clear majority when he
said, "the concerns underlying the regulation of corporate political
activity are simply absent with regard to Massachusetts Citizens for
Life .... Voluntary political associations do not suddenly present
the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate
form."6 8 The reason that group status made a constitutional difference, according to the majority, was that spending by either a business corporation or a union "raises the prospect that resources
amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an
' 69
unfair advantage in the political marketplace.
The basic interpretive problem Massachusetts Citizens for Life
poses is that it is hard to know how emphatically the majority drew
this distinction among corporate forms. Yet there it is: Massachusetts Citizen For Life would have lost but for its status as nonprofit. Still, we must ask, doesn't the MassachusettsCitizensfor Life
66. 107 S. Ct. at 618.
67. Id. at 618-19.
68. Id. at 630. Brennan noted that "[s]ome corporations have features more akin to
voluntary political associations than business firms, and therefore should not have to bear
burdens on independent spending solely because of their incorporated status." Id. at 631.
69. Id. at 628. At this point, Brennan emphasized the dangers of corruption arising
from the fact that resources in a corporate treasury do not indicate the level of public support, but elsewhere in the opinion he conflated for-profit corporations and unions for purposes of his first amendment analysis. See, e.g., id. at 630. While clearly relevant, a discussion
of labor law matters is beyond the scope of this Article. For a provocative introduction, see
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (individual can engage alone in
"concerted activity" protected under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1982)); Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v.
Claibourne Hardware and its Implicationsfor American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984);
Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417 (1984).
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decision really turn on the type of expression involved? Political
speech, after all, is often defined as the kind of speech most worthy
of constitutional solicitude.7" This is plausible, of course, but the
particular type of group involved and its function as a vehicle for
group solidarity and amplification help explain Massachusetts Citizens for Life. In this sense, then, Massachusetts Citizens for Life
hints at the role to be played by an independent right of freedom of
association.
V. THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT: THE TEsTs
APPLIED IN CITIZENS AGAINST RENT CONTROL AND
WIDMAR V VINCENT

My goal is modest: I hope to provide a working framework to
delimit the "operative facts" in disputes about associations. 71 A
problem associations generally pose for legal analysis is that lawyers
grow accustomed to thinking in binary terms such as government/individual or group/individual. In the spate of recent decisions vigorously intervening to protect political expenditures by
associations, a majority seems willing to use freedom of association
in an entirely undifferentiated way. Two cases decided within a
week of one another illustrate this troubling phenomenon.
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, Chief Justice Burger waxed rhapsodic in his majority opinion about the
American "tradition of volunteer committees for collective action
[that] manifested itself in myriad community and public activities." 72 Somehow, this tradition extended to efforts by corporate
managers to communicate their dollars and cents messages to voters.7" The thrust of Burger's opinion was that Berkeley's limit on
election spending offended freedom of association, a right Burger
70. The most famous statement of this approach is to be found in A.

MEIKLEJOHN,

POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). A more recent indication of how narrow this approach might

actually be is available in Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). The Court has often emphasized the "indispensable" and "core" qualities of political speech.
71. Arthur Corbin, whom Karl Llewellyn identified as his "father in the law" and who
was in turn a source of inspiration for Grant Gilmore, was known for his attention to an
incredible array of what Corbin termed "operative facts" in the contract 'cases Corbin collected for his treatise. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 79-80 (1977).

72.
73.
(1978).
(federal

454 U.S. 290, 294 (1982).
See, eg., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907
But see California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm., 453 U.S. 182 (1981)
limitation on contributions to politically active associations upheld).
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found to overlap and blend with freedom of expression 74 and to require "exacting judicial scrutiny."7 5 Burger was so taken with the

value of collective efforts in the American past that he found it necessary to state explicitly that not all activities that are legal for individuals are also legal for groups.7 6
Less than a week before the Berkeley decision, the Court had
explained in Widmar v. Vincent that religious worship and discussion "are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment." 7 7 Justice Powell's majority opinion applied a "level
of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint" and struck
down the decision by the University of Missouri at Kansas City to
deny access to campus facilities sought by an evangelical Christian
group for purposes of worship and religious discussion.7 8
The decision in Widmar certainly seems right. But it seems so
largely because in an important sense "the first amendment's proscription against censorship is itself simply a specialized equal protection guarantee."79 One of the crucial ways in which the Court
recently has bogged down in consideration of freedom of associa74. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298 (noting that freedom of association
and freedom of expression are virtually "inseparable" in this context).
75. Id. at 294.
76. Burger wrote, "There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet
illegal if performed in concert with others, but political expression is not one of them." Id. at
296. On this point, therefore, Burger implicitly accepted Tom Emerson's general approach to
freedom of associations claims, though in the context of the case, the two seem strange bedfellows indeed. Burger also implicitly rejected even the limited claim for an independent freedom of association right made in Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977). Raggi sought recognition of "[t]he basic principle...
that whatever action a person can pursue as an individual, freedom of association must ensure he can pursue with others." Id. at 15. Relying primarily on NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Raggi used the dictum that an association and its members
"are in every practical sense identical,"id. at 459, to claim that an association is no more than
the sum of its individual members and to assert that this notion "seems essential" in a society
in which the individual is the ultimate concern of the social order. Raggi, supra, at 12. She
thereby somewhat undercut the idea of an independent freedom of association right advanced
in her title.
77. 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and Justice
White dissented from Justice Powell's majority opinion. One might have thought the free
exercise clause of the first amendment more obviously relevant and surely possessed of sufficient clout to provide a basis for the decision in Widmar v. Vincent. It is therefore striking
that the majority repeatedly invoked freedom of association and employed the extremely protective analogy of a prior restraint test, at least when it could discern free exercise of religion
in combination with freedom of expression.
78. Id. at 267 n.5 (1981) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181, 184 (1972), which
held it unconstitutional for a university to exclude S.D.S. chapter on grounds of freedom of
expression and freedom of association).
79. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F. 2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981) (Wisdom, J.), rev'd, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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tion claims is that it has lost track of the point Tom Emerson made
when he discussed the role of equal protection analysis in the first
amendment context. Tom wrote, "Basically, equal protection requirements demand fairness as between relevant interests in the dispensation of governmental support."8 It is incoherent simply to
assume, as the Court now does so readily, that the extremely permissive rational relationship test that is commonplace for equal protection analysis of social and economic classifications is also
appropriate when freedom of association rights are at stake. Proof
of "bad motive" causation, a prominent necessary precondition in
equal protection decisions, actually is entirely misplaced in the sensitive realm of governmental entanglement with the first
amendment.
The quest for neutral, general principles about freedom of association is doomed. The protective coloration of what may appear to
be clear dichotomies borrowed from the current rubric of equal protection doctrine merely exacerbates unnamed and unaccountable
discretion. Neither bureaucrats nor judges need look beyond
groups they feel fairly comfortable recognizing or punishing.
Widmar itself begins to suggest how the crucial role of group
identity is lost by simply reasoning by analogy to equal protection
analysis. Widmar, and even more so other "public forum" decisions since, have not considered the importance of affiliation itself
for group identity and, ultimately, for individual identity as well.
But at least Widmar suggests a rigorous constitutional standard,
akin to the special scrutiny applied to prior restraints. Widmar
hints of the extent to which groups such as paraders, journalists,
labor activists, and evangelicals need their group identities to construct the powerful first amendment arguments they should have.
Unfortunately, Widmar has not been followed in its sensitive scrutiny of governmental intrusions on groups. Instead, several wrongheaded approaches to freedom of association, to which I now turn
briefly, illustrate some of the mistakes made when equal protection
analysis is imported uncritically into the freedom of association
context.
80, Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 802
(1981). Tom noted that when the government participates in the system of expression directly, however, new difficulties arise that might usefully be approached by distinguishing
between macro and micro levels of the government's affirmative first amendment

involvement.
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WHEN FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IS LESS OR GREATER
THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS

The Doomed Search for Governmental Neutrality: A
DisastrousTrilogy ConcerningNon-Profits

Even after the Jaycees and Rotary Club decisions, a non-profit
association that decides to discriminate in a way that surely would
be unconstitutional if perpetrated by a state official might be able to
insulate its action from constitutional scrutiny. Nonetheless, under
Bob Jones University v. United States,"t such a victory might prove
pyrrhic; the non-profit might lose its non-profit tax status. Thus, we
must consider whether government neutrality is an adequate or
even reasonable constitutional standard for administrators choosing
which associations should receive government benefits or burdens.
In Bob Jones, on statutory grounds the Court upheld an Internal
Revenue Service decision to deny tax-exempt status to private religious schools that practice racial discrimination. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion did not confront freedom of association
explicitly. Moreover, in part because there was some reason to
doubt the sincerity of the religious defenses raised by the private
schools, the majority slid past the knotty first amendment issues
lurking beneath its construction of congressional intent and congressional silence.82 Instead, with more than a nod to Pangloss,
Burger stressed our nation's unquestioned commitment to the eradication of racial discrimination. By definition, according to Burger,
such discrimination is inconsistent with statutory requirements to
qualify as a non-profit organization under the federal tax laws. The
majority upheld IRS discretion to determine tax-exempt status with
no more particularity than that the non-profit group be consistent
with "the public interest," "the common community conscience"
and the "declared position of the whole government."8 3 Such a
standard makes it difficult to determine who, if anyone, is guarding
the guardians.
Each April, we are clearly reminded of how pervasive the IRS
often seems, but the Court's manner of deciding Bob Jones81. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding authority of Internal Revenue Service to deny § 501
(c)(3) tax-exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race in admissions or
school policies, despite claims of a religious basis for such discrimination).
82. For example, though Chief Juttice Burger's majority opinion spoke of a mysterious,
"unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence" in implicitly ratifying IRS rulings, id. at
599, the IRS moved only after years of litigation. Burger argued that, "[n]on-action by Congress is not often a useful guide, but the non-action here is significant." Id. at 600.
83. Id. at 592.
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although I do not attack the result-allows the IRS virtually unreviewable discretion to determine what "common law," "common
sense," and "history" tell us about whether a non-profit association
is comporting with "deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice." 84
To make matters worse, in a subsequent decision based on the
convoluted technicalities of "standing," the Court determined in Allen v. Wright8 5 that taxpayers, even taxpayers who were parents of
minority students within districts under desegregation orders, could
not sue to compel the IRS actually to enforce the policy upheld in
Bob Jones. Moreover, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington, Inc., 6 a case decided the day before Bob Jones, the
Court unanimously agreed that it was not a denial of either first
amendment or equal protection rights to forbid a non-profit to
lobby Congress if it wished to retain its § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, though other non-profit organizations such as veterans groups
were exempt from the lobbying prohibition. Taxation with Representation, which has received little attention, is important for two
reasons: first, then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion viewed tax
exemptions as a form of "largesse.""s He stated, "Both tax exemptions and tax deductions are a form of subsidy that is administered
through the tax system... [and] has much the same effect as a cash
grant.""8 This approach allowed the unanimous Court to emphasize that the Constitution permits great discretion in decisions distributing such largesse.
The second significant point about Taxation with Representation
is that it illustrates the peculiar application of important principles
of neutrality in recent first amendment decisions. Because in Taxation with Representation the Court perceived no invidious discrimination against the particular ideas advanced by the particular nonprofit association involved, the Court found it quite easy to notice
no constitutional violation. 9
84. Id.
85. 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (denying standing to parents of black school children who
claimed that the Internal Revenue Service was not enforcing the Bob Jones decision and was
failing its statutory duty to deny section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to private academies that
discriminated on the basis of race).
86. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred.
87. Id. at 549.

88. Id. at 544.
89. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion stressed that, for three Justices, it was only
because, as administered by the IRS, Taxation with Representation had a readily available
opportunity to create a lobbying affiliate under section 501(c)(4) that they rejected Taxation
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The Court's uncritical approach to hypothetical neutrality in
administrative decisions also helps to explain the anomalous holding in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.9"
In the course of denying a first amendment and equal protection
claim of access to an annual charitable campaign in the federal
workplace, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion determined rather
mechanistically that the federal campaign constituted a "nonpublic
forum."9 1 Therefore, by a four-three vote, the Cornelius decision
held that absent proof of impermissible motivation, the administrator's decision as to which non-profit organizations would be included in the combined campaign would prevail so long as it
appeared "reasonable." 9 2
The central difficulty with this, as with Massachusetts Citizens
for Life and Taxation with Representation, is that government neutrality is entirely elusive in these cases. Their holdings are inconsistent and seem to rest on an unarticulated nexus between the extent
to which the Justices value the particular expressive act involved
and how they perceive the relative worthiness of the particular association seeking constitutional protection. Non-profit associations
that vaguely appear similarly situated may be treated very differently under the constitutional standard suggested by Bob Jones,
Taxation with Representation and Cornelius. In sharp contrast to
Claiborne Hardwareand Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, this trilogy
allows administrators almost unbounded discretion in crucial decisions directly affecting non-profit associations.
B.

What to Do about Freedom of Association?

The idea that our horror at censorship suggests a "specialized
with Representation's challenge to the section 501(c)(3) restriction. But the majority's approach was quite different. Applying a standard that "lilt is... not irrational" for Congress
to subsidize lobbying by veterans groups, Rehnquist's opinion invoked the abortion funding
decisions, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), to
support the proposition that so long as government regulations are not affirmatively aimed at
suppression, the government is entitled to encourage action it favors. Id. at 550.
90. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Justice O'Connor wrote for four Justices. Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, as did Justice Stevens. Justices Marshall and Powell did
not take part in the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court after extensive and somewhat complicated maneuvering in the lower courts and within the executive branch, and the
Court remanded for consideration of the issue of whether the administrator could be proved
to have acted with a bad motive.
91. Id. at 802-06.
92. Id. at 800. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (discharge of assistant district attorney upheld, since her questionnaire circulated to fellow workers was not
"speech on matters of public concern").
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equal protection guarantee" indicates why much more exacting
scrutiny is warranted. The complete and unquestioning reliance on
the presumed neutrality of administrators in the trilogy I just criticized also underscores why the insistence on proof of "but for" discriminatory motivation in equal protection decisions over the past
decade is inappropriate when sensitive first amendment rights are at
stake. Finally, since the status of the association seems determinative, the nascent typology in decisions such as the Jaycees and Massachusetts Citizensfor Life suggests a useful analogy between nonprofit associations, for example, and the "checking value" we celebrate and expect of a robust, free press.
I do not mean to belittle the difficulty in deciding the cases I
have discussed. Yet the idea that freedom of association is an independent and important right suggests, at a minimum, that those
who seek to regulate non-profit groups should be required to justify
their intrusions with reasons far more significant than those the
Court accepted unquestioningly, for example, in Taxation with Representation and Cornelius. Since elimination of the ongoing burden
of racism and sexism is a compelling, not to say overwhelming justification in our society, the results in Bob Jones and Jaycees should
be applauded, albeit not for the reasons announced by the Court.
Moreover, even though Tom Emerson suggested that "general organizational activities, including the conduct of schools" should be
safeguarded as fully "as the actual utterance of the words themselves,"9 3 it would not surprise me if he joined me in approving the
outcomes in Bob Jones and in Runyon v. McCrary.94
These decisions indicate, however, that the group quality does
make a profound difference. How can we get a handle on this analytic morass? We cannot actually achieve a general theory, but perhaps we have begun to work toward a few hard-earned
generalizations. We do tend to need a theory to tell us what we see.
Surely the status of the association and the type of communicative
act involved emerge as critical factors. It is also clear that the
Court's recent decisions have allowed administrators to treat similar groups differently on no basis other than a dubious presumption
of neutrality. Finally,. recognizing that there will be a need for some
government oversight and some means to ascertain that non-profit
associations actually are bona-fide non-profit associations, I advocate thinking about intrusive governmental regulation of non-profit
93. See supra text accompanying note 3.
94. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 held to reach and prohibit racial discrimination by private, commercially-operated nonsectarian schools).
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associations with some of the ginger concern we are accustomed to
affording newspapers.
Whether the press, singled out as it is in the text of the first
amendment, can claim any exceptional protection has been hotly
debated for years.95 In fact, however, in numerous ways journalists
do enjoy special protection. They get access to the best, sometimes
to the only seats in courtrooms, legislative galleries, and executive
"press" conferences. Reporters enjoy special, formal privileges in a
majority of state statutory codes and more privileged status in numerous other ways as well.9 6 Such special protection is sometimes
justified on the grounds that reporters serve as surrogates for the
rest of us. Yet there hardly can be doubt that government officials,
even judges, treat members of the press with special sensitivity and
that reporters, editors, and publishers are not democratically accountable to those whom they may represent. Members of the
fourth estate are members of a special group. Publishers and media
executives strive for profit, yet we defer to the press because it helps
check governmental power, as well as mediating, informing, and entertaining. At least in news and editorial functions, groups
denominated "the press" are thought to merit particular constitutional protection.
It is not a new idea that at least some associations are closely
analogous to the press. To return to where we started our brief historical consideration of associations in America, Tocqueville wrote,
"In democratic countries knowledge of how to combine is the
mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends
that of all the others."97 He noticed "a necessary connection be95. See, e.g., Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595
(1979) and other articles in the same symposium, as well as the symposium articles in 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 785 (1980). The debate was touched off by Justice Stewart's theoretical
discussion in Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
96. By 1974, over half the states had enacted "reporter shield" laws providing various
procedures to shield reporters who confronted demands for information by government officials or grand juries. J. GORA, THE RIGHTS OF REPORTERS 243-48 (1974) (summarizing
state shield laws). See also Eckhardt & McKey, Reporter's Privilege: An Update, 12 CONN.
L. REy. 435 (1980); Sylvester, How the States Govern the News Media: A Survey of Selected
Jurisdictions, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 723 (1986). In response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978) (which rejected a constitutional claim that a newspaper should enjoy special
protection from a newsroom search), Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-5-7, 11-12 (1982), providing special protection from searches for those
engaged in "public communication." See generally cases collected and discussed in Soifer,
Freedom of the Press in the United States, in PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 79, 108-17 (P. Lahav ed. 1986).
97. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 517.
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tween associations and newspapers," 98 and compared and contrasted their relative merits and claims for freedom. It was the
necessity of associations as a check and a balance in a democracy
that Tocqueville stressed, along with the educational function associations perform for their members. He said, "An association, be
it political, industrial, commercial, or even literary or scientific, is
an educated and powerful body of citizens which cannot be twisted
to any man's will or quietly trodden down, and by defending its
private interests against the encroachments of power, it saves the
common liberties." 99

Obviously, much tragic history during this century emphasizes
the danger of allowing too much power to groups. As Hannah Arendt pointed out, "Power springs up whenever people get together
and act in concert." 1" We also have become more aware of the
overwhelming power that corporations and government exert in our
lives. Therefore, it seems particularly appropriate to concentrate
some of our attention on ways to connect constitutional theory to
the reality of our identities as members of myriad associations. I
have tried to suggest why some associations, some of the time, do
merit sensitive constitutional protection. In particular, those in the
voluntary or independent sector may properly be considered a fifth
estate, functioning in ways analogous to the fourth estate of the
press and to the norm-generating enclaves of religious
associations. 101
CONCLUSION

It is a commonplace of American history in general, and American legal history in particular, that we focus on individualism to the
virtual exclusion of all else. If anything, the prodigious impact of
law and economics, with its concentration on the autonomous
profit-maximizing individual, exacerbates that trend. The misleading either/or choice between government and individual ignores our
98. Id at 518.
99. Id. at 697.

100. H. ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 52 (1969). Arendt is quoted and discussed insightfully
in Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1031-35
(1978).
101. For development of definitions for and a defense of activism by the independent
sector, see John Simon's FoundationsandPublic Controversy An Affirmative View and, for a
spirited contrary view, see Jeffrey Hart's Foundationsand Social Activism: A Critical View,
both in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS (F. Heinman ed. 1973). The locus classicus for current discussions about norm-generating communities in legal circles is the work of the late
Robert Cover, particularly Cover, supra note 4.
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long tradition of a sense of collective responsibility. We often make
an anachronistic translation of Spencerian social theory back into
02
the minds and motives of the Constitution's founding generation. 1
We tend to forget that one finds countless references to the virtues of associations both in the pre-revolutionary era and throughout our history as a nation. By the mid-1700s, for example,
associations formed for local civic purposes enjoyed considerable
prominence. 103 In the 1820s, William Ellery Channing regarded associations as the "most powerful springs" of social action and found
"the energy with which the principle of combination, or of action

by joint forces" to be one of the most remarkable features of his
times. " 4 It is hardly surprising that James Bryce, the foremost foreign observer of post-Civil War America, echoed antebellum observers when he noted the pervasive American "habit of forming
associations" and remarked that "[a]ssociations are created, extended and worked in the United States more quickly and effectively than in any other country."' 0 5
This recurrent theme is not the entire story, to be sure, nor is
102. See, e.g., C.

GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND

RAILROADS, 1800-1890 (1960); 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH (1947); L.
HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT (1948); M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES
SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA:

(1956); H.

A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY,

1820-1861 (1969).
103. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 38, at 26.
104. Id. at 32-33. The spirit of association was neither limited to joining forces in order
to accomplish specific ends, nor to a specific period in American life. Sometimes, of course,
Americans sought what Julius Goebel called the "creative magic of mere association" in
order to confirm their own identities at the expense of others. Id. at 24. But the outburst of
collective activity in the 1820s, for example, produced a plethora of new-fangled associative
ventures, including Owenite utopian experiments, the spread of asylums, workingmen's associations, pro and anti-Masonic activity, and various forms of Christian communalism. See
generally A. WALLACE, ROCKDALE 275-92 (1978); C. Weisbrod, supra note 39. For a famous early example of protection of association in the labor context, see Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (IV Met.) (1842) (Shaw, C.J.). For the political implications of Masons
and anti-Masonic movements, see, e.g., D. LIPSON, FREEMASONRY IN FEDERALIST CONNECTICUT, 1789-1835 (1977). For the social context of the growth of asylums, see D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971). This flourishing of the collective impulse
was in part at least both an attempt to revive the spirit of the Revolution and an effort to keep
threatening forces of industrialization, materialism, and urbanization at bay.
105. J. BRYCE, 2 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 239 (1889). Morton Keller makes a
similar point about how the Civil War "opened the door to bold experiments in voluntary
association for public ends," with such influential groups as the U.S. Sanitary Commission,
Union League Clubs, the first national trade associations and a variety of organizations
formed to aid the freedmen. M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 7 (1977). According to Keller,
however, voluntary associations gained even greater importance as the century ended. Id. at
517. As Lawrence Friedman put it, "The notion was: organize or die; and it was the theme
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historic description synonymous with normative constitutional proposals.10 6 Once again, however, Tocqueville's uncanny insight
seems particularly pertinent. He stressed the difference between
American associations and associations in Europe, where, like
newspapers, associations tended to represent well-defined classes
and to seek to influence governmental action directly. Echoing
Madison, Tocqueville argued that "no countries need associations
more-to prevent either despotism of parties or the arbitrary rule of
a prince-than those with a democratic social state."' 1 7 Furthermore, "In a country like the United States, where differences of
the right of associations can review are only matters of nuance,
10°8
main, so to say, without limits.

I do not claim with Tocqueville that the right of associations

''can remain ... without limits," though he was perceptive about

the extent to which Americans generally tend to share beliefs in
contrast to more vigorously clashing ideologies in European countries. I do not advocate an absolute freedom of association right.
Nor do I suggest that, if the right is given independent status, it
should always prevail or always carry the same weight. But I do
want to emphasize the inconsistency and false rigor in the categorical approach now in vogue in the Supreme Court. It may not be
possible to achieve a "philosophically continuous series."' 1 9 Nevertheless, an independent right of freedom of association makes logical, historical, and normative sense.
of American law, East and West, in the last half of the 19th centrury, in every area and arena
of life." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 370 (2d ed. 1985).
106. For a famous negative reaction, see George Washington's Farewell Address, in
which Washington expressed his concern about "combinations and associations.., with the
real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the
constitutional authorities." 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 209 (J. Richardson ed. 1896). Of course, Washington's warning was not heeded, but both it and Washington's famous rejection of overtures by the Society of Cincinnatus indicate something of early
ambivalence in responses to the proliferation of associations in America.
As Gordon Wood makes abundantly clear in his THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969), the men who wrote the Constitution feared both factions and
the power of the governors over the governed. Rather than attempt to eliminate factions,
however, or to diminish what they viewed as necessary national governmental power,
Madison and his colleagues attempted to employ factions and private associations as necessary counterweights to each other and to government power.
107. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 192.
108. Id. at 194. For support for the idea that a tendency toward the middle, and toward
the claims of the middle class, is a master fact in American history, see, eg., L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 105, at 210.
109. Grant Gilmore discusses how even Holmes nodded about his ability to accomplish
the task he set for himself as a judge, to create a "philosophically continuous series" through
his decisions. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 53 (1977).
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If this essay makes any progress at all, it is fitting that it does so
in honor of Tom Emerson. After all, the constitutionalists of two
centuries ago explicitly provided protection for those people concerned enough to assemble together. They linked this right directly
to other constitutional barriers, similarly erected to serve those who
would speak, write, petition, or pray against orthodoxy. They
heeded groups of people who, both in the wake of the Revolution
and in the years to follow, might convince others to join them
against injustice by the power of their arguments and the strength
of their commitment.
Tom Emerson has long seemed to me to be exactly the kind of
constitutionalist I would wish present whenever I imagine a serious
meeting at which constitutional issues of the first order might be
discussed and actually decided. Call it a Rawlsian original position,
an ideal constitutional convention, or the best kind of education in
the highest values of constitutional law, Tom Emerson would be my
nominee.
As it happens, Gordon Wood sums up those men who gathered
in Philadelphia in the stifling summer of 1787 in a way that may
romanticize them, but that actually manages to begin to describe
Tom Emerson. Wood writes of "an end of the classical conception
of politics and the beginning of what might be called a romantic
view of politics."" The men who perpetrated this revolution possessed a "more realistic sense of political behavior in the society
itself, among the people." They "embodied a new kinetic sense"
and "placed a new emphasis on the piecemeal and the concrete in
politics at the expense of order and completeness.""' The key additional quality Tom Emerson would bring to any gathering of serious
constitutionalists is a quality he brings to every endeavor. To Tom
Emerson, law and justice can be associated inseparably.

110.

G. WOOD, supra note 105, at 606.

111. Id.

